On the 22 August 1962 a serious attempt was made to assassinate President Charles De Gaulle of France. Much has been written about this assassination attempt and a good deal is inaccurate and speculative. My purpose is to outline the physical and technical aspects of the actual ambush. There is conflicting information, as is so often the case. Visiting the actual location answered a lot of questions.
The perpetrators were an organised group of 15 men, of which 12 took part in the attack, the remainder were involved in domestic assistance. They were mostly former military, extremely right-wing, idealists, who vehemently opposed De Gaulle and the role he played in securing independence for Algeria in July 1962. Up to that point Algeria had been a very established French colony in North Africa.
The French military had played a key part in the annexation since 1830 and had fought hard in French Algeria, establishing order and security and fighting and successfully quelling anti-French insurgents who were intent on destabilising this developing country as long as it remained in French hands. The main Algerian opposition to the French Republic was the FLN who had been inspired by insurgents in the Middle East. De Gaulle’s action was seen as a total betrayal by many in the military, so much so that an illegal rebellious organisation was created by former military officers, the OAS.
The OAS, (Organisation de l’armee secrete), upheld a single belief and role; to reinstate French Algeria. Their aim was passionate but totally unrealistic. Not all of De Gaulle’s military critics became members of the OAS which essentially was a terrorist organisation, something the OAS did not consider itself to be. Whilst it upheld a seemingly honourable view, over time it descended into a rogue band of murdering criminals. They resorted to robbing banks and stealing vehicles for their operations and securing weapons from undesirable sources.
This independent group were not OAS and they were led by a former French Airforce officer and engineer, 35 year old Lt Col Jean Bastien-Thiry. His second in command and planner was a former French army Lieutenant, 36 year old Alain de la Tocnaye. They shared a view of the OAS and considered the OAS as essentially a bunch of hoodlums and puerile terrorists. Bastien-Thiry did not approve of their image and methods but he was prepared to work with them and they had allegedly agreed to supply weapons and finance to support this particular attempt. Some of his team certainly had a close relationship with the OAS. The group even included three Hungarians.
Bastien-Thiry planned a roadside linear ambush in the western Paris suburb of Petit Clamart. His group secured sufficient intelligence to plan this ambush. They knew that President De Gaulle would use particular routes out of the city in his determination to spend time at home with his wife in Colombey, SE of Paris when he was not required in the capital.
Both Bastien-Thiry and La Tocnaye had funded a high proportion of the costs for this ambush from their own pockets. Bastien-Thiry did not favour robbing banks to secure money for operations. This would suggest there was an ironic element of morality in their thinking, ‘collar and tie’ terrorists if you like. They called their planned attack, Operation ‘Charollotte Corday’.
His team were organised into two main gun groups which would be positioned 120 metres apart on opposite sides of a particular section of road in Petit Clamart armed with automatic weapons. There was a third group on the south side almost opposite the north group. This group was likely a support element.
This actual ambush was dramatically depicted at the start of the 1973 film, ‘The Day of the Jackal’ which was a fictional narrative written by Frederick Forsythe. The ambush scene at the very start of the movie was not filmed at the actual location on the Rue de la Liberation.
The real location consisted of one, two and three story buildings accommodating shops, outlets, cafes and a fuel station on a very straight and wide section of suburban road. The linear style ambush was spread over 300 metres.
The film producers depicted the location nearby. Their choice was a narrow, bendy section of road, tree lined and walled. The movie ambush construction from Bastien-Thiry’s lookout position to the furthest gun group was spread over about 75 metres.
Some writers and critics have remarked on how the film location closely resembled the actual location. Having visited the actual location in June 2025, the essential road structure dimensions, (which are unchanged), and the total distance between Thiry-Bastien’s lookout position to the furthest gun group bears no resemblance in the film to the real location.
At the time Charles De Gaulle had served France for two periods as President. The first between 1944 -1946. At the time of the 1962 ambush he had been President since 1958 and he would continue until 1969.
He was a controversial leader, both loved and despised. An army general and a veteran of both world wars he came to power as an imposing and extremely intelligent leader. He was a physically brave individual, easily recognised at 196 cm / 6’5” inches tall. He famously dismissed a lot of the security precautions he was intitled to, believing it was unreasonable and unnecessarily. He didn’t want to appear afraid of or intimidated by his enemies and contemporaries; he chose to be seen, recognised, exposed and leading from the front.
Political assassinations and attempts have existed throughout history, there is nothing unique or new about them. To most rational people the slaying of world leaders, often in public where the attempts generally take place are deplorable acts. Irrespective of political persuasion even the most unpopular politicians are not generally at the physical mercy of people who oppose them. Modern society doesn’t condone such brutal solutions. However, there are those amongst us who are prepared to kill influential politicians, leaders, dictators and monarchs. In their view it is a solution, a natural process; even at the risk of their own lives.
The United States of America has had four serving presidents and one presidential candidate assassinated. One serving president has been seriously wounded and three presidential candidates injured, one of whom was severely crippled.
In addition, scores of politicians, aids, security officials and members of the public have been killed and injured in politically motivated attempts to murder world leaders. The favoured and most common methods of assassination on a global basis are prosecuted with firearms.
Close to the date of this planned operation his team were let down by the OAS by having some promised allocated weapons and support ‘redirected’ to other operations. Bastien-Thiry had to resort to procuring some inferior weapons to fully arm his group and only a small amount of time was allocated to practise with them in an isolated wood. Rather than hiring the vehicles required as was his normal practise, financial constraints forced him to resort to stealing them on this occasion.
This routine Presidential convoy on 22 August was leaving Paris after important government meetings. This consisted of De Gaulle’s car, a Citroen DS 19 driven by Gendarme Francis Marroux. Next to him was de Gaulle’s aide-de-camp, his son-in-law, Col Alain de Boissieu. The President was in the left rear seat next to his wife Yvonne de Gaulle.
In the following DS 19 were four occupants, the driver, two senior police officers and a military doctor, Jean-Denis Degos. Two police outriders were on Triumph motorcycles. They had left the Elysée Palace in Paris and were travelling west through the city and into the suburbs to Villacoublay airbase to an awaiting aircraft that would fly the President and his wife home.
De Gaulle favoured the French built Citroen DS 19. Designed by Bertone it was a ground breaking, innovative futuristic vehicle with a unique hydro pneumatic suspension, steering and braking system. His personal DS 19 had a raised roof to accommodate his stature and a large sunroof which allowed De Gaulle to stand in the back of the car on state occasions. The car was not armoured however. For his armed and protective security staff, their President’s unpretentious preferences were a concern. De Gaulle for instance on some occasions insisted that his convoy details stopped at traffic lights in suburban areas when he was being conveyed away from the heart of Government in Paris.
On this particular direction out of Paris there were two route options that the President would take to Villacoublay Airbase. For security the chosen option was decided upon at the last minute. Thiry-Bastien had an observer positioned at the option point. The plan was simple. As soon as the convoy reached this location and embarked on the decided road the observer phoned through the route to the ambush team. They then had time to get into position.
The President travelled on what was then Route 306 which would have the ambush group waiting for him in the suburb of Petit Clamart.
The outline of an ambush
Successful ambushing should be a very determined and violent action giving targets no or very little opportunity to escape and or retaliate. Initiating the action is not by a shout or a whistle blast, it is a high concentration of immediate fire directed at the target as it enters a predetermined ‘kill zone’.
In this scenario, firing automatic weapons across a 20 metre street at a moving traversing target would automatically result in rounds striking buildings and structures beyond the target coupled with the added danger of ricochet. This ambush group would have been fully aware of this risk.
Fired rounds would easily penetrate glass, thus entering buildings and continue on to penetrate internal furniture and fittings. Bullets could pass through target vehicles if struck and continue to cause damage on exit. If innocent people were unlucky to be in the way there would be no control over the outcome.
According to a drawn copyright reconstruction map of the ambush the gun and support teams were accommodated in at least five stolen vehicles. There were two vehicles on the south side and three on the north, each side of the ambush route. The two gun groups were positioned 120 metres apart. This map is poor because it does not indicate Bastien-Thiry’s lookout and signal position, (to the left), which is vital in order to appreciate the scale of the ambush and that specific contribution to its failure.
The north side gun group were in Renault Estafette, a yellow van positioned alongside the road next to a hedge parked in the direction of traffic flow. This accommodated Buisnes, Varga, Sari, Bernier and Murat which was going to be the first element the convoy would encounter coming from central Paris. According to the map this comprised Murat as the driver along with the others as gunmen.
The map suggests this group is armed with a light machine gun, a 7.5 mm Châtellerault FM MAC 24 or a 24/29. Opposite them on the south side and slightly to the east was a parked Peugeot van. The team here consisted of Magade as the driver with Bertin and Conde as the guns.
The image below looking west in the travel direction of the Presidential convoy shows where the Peugeot was situated and according to the original map almost exactly where the white truck and car are parked. The Buisines gun group were on the north side where you can just see the illuminated green traffic light on the right of the image.
Directly opposite, we have to assume was the Trianon café where you can see the black arched entrance to what is now a business entrance. I have been unable to find any contemporary images of the café despite the gunfire damage inflicted on the facility. No such café or restaurant facility exits there now.
On the south side 120 metres down the road was Alain de la Tocnaye in a parked Citroen DS 19 in Rue de Bois facing the intersection, (where the blue Range Rover is in this image). With him was Watin and Prevost as gunmen.
Also to the north there are two Fruite vehicles, (getaway cars). I have not found any other narratives that mentions these. These vehicles were parked in Rue de Bois, the street to the left of the Yamaha dealership, (the TV and radio shop at the time), and directly opposite the south side La Tocnaye gun group.
I do wonder if this map has been drawn up from written plans constructed by Bastien-Thiry. To have planned this ambush he must have scripted a plan in order to brief and direct his team. Once the ambush was initiated and they withdrew there must have been something for the investigators to work from to construct this document even if it was from a compilation of witness statements and perpetrator confessions.
The drawn map below details the position of the ambush groups in red and most importantly the position of Bastien-Thiry in his observation position in yellow nearly 200 metres from the first gun group. The TV/radio shop which was hit by gunfire is highlighted in green.
The up to date google map image highlights the same positions.
The light was fading as the presidential convoy group approached. Traffic was light but there were still people about on the streets. Bastien-Thiry was well aware of the danger of causing collateral damage and casualties to innocent bystanders in such an operation. Previous attempts had actually been abandoned for this reason. On this occasion I imagine the risk was considered appropriate to the opportunity.
Bastien-Thiry was positioned alone at the eastern end of the ambush position 195 metres away from the north side ambush group. He was outside his parked Simca near a bus stop, (which is still there as you can see in the image below). He was in a location where he had a view of both the approaching convoy and the north side fire team as depicted in these 2025 images. I suspect Bastien-Thiry chose this spot because there is a slight kink in the road where the tram line deviates north. If he had positioned himself closer to the north side gun group his view east could have been compromised.
His reasoning for this can be understood but his ambush methodology broke all the basic ambushing rules. By using a waved signal he risked jeopardising and exposing the attack.
The first image here is the view west from the bus stop looking towards the ambush groups and the second image is the view east, (from the other side of the road), from where De Gaulle would be approaching.
The plan was he would wave a rolled up newspaper at the north side team to signal the approach. They were 195 metres away; perhaps a rolled up newspaper was not an ideal signal method. The second gun team on the south side was 315 metres from Bastien-Thiry. They would be solely dependant on the first gun group seeing the signal and initiating the ambush.
As the Presidential convoy approached at 20:10 hours at a brisk speed, (approx. 50 mph/80 kph), Bastien-Thiry initiated the signal but the fading light obscured clear sight of him and the convoy was suddenly coming into the north team kill zone. The signal method was also risky because the DS19 drivers could easily have seen him and it would have looked suspicious.
The team on the north side positioned alongside their vehicles were expected to initiate the ambush. They indeed opened fire as De Gaulle’s vehicle passed in front of them left to right but they were slightly late. They also had problems, the sub machine guns some of them used had stoppages. The gunman armed with these had not had sufficient practise with them. There is a standard procedure to clear stoppages and get a weapon firing again but it is a drill that creates an interruption and delay. If that drill is not well practised the delay is compounded.
At least one of them was carrying a military 7.5mm Châtellerault FM MAC 24 or a 24/29. A powerful and dependable French built light machine gun. Designed and produced by the Manufacture d’Armes de Châtellerault. Similar to the British Bren gun.
To be fully effective with this type of military support weapon the user ideally has an anticipated and settled line of sight of the target, difficult in the circumstances of this attack. The user could hardly be set up in an ideal position in full view of passing witnesses before the convoy arrival. There were apparently reliable German MP 40’s amongst the group and one of the Hungarians was armed with a .45 Thompson sub machine gun, a thoroughly reliable weapon.
Nevertheless and despite the problems the north side fire team did manage to hit De Gaulle’s car, puncturing the rear right tyre and sending bullets through the vehicle narrowly missing the occupants. Directly beyond the two passing Citroen’s fired bullets struck and entered the Café Au Trianon on the other side of the road. Fortunately the facility was closed on that day.
A single stray bullet entered a Panhard saloon car momentarily beyond and behind De Gaulle’s Citroen, driving in the opposite direction; the round entered the front windscreen and struck the steering wheel. A piece of shattered hard material cut the hand of the driver, Roland Fillion. He was with his wife and their three children in the car.
Seconds later the south side gun team opened fire as De Gaulle’s convoy as it past them right to left. Their gunfire punctured the front left tyre and again struck the vehicle.
Bullets this time continued beyond the traversing target vehicles then struck and entered a TV and radio shop,(which is now a Yamaha motorcycle dealership). This facility had only closed 10 minutes earlier. One of the ambush vehicles next to the north gun team, driven by Alain de la Tocnaye emerged from the Rue de Bois in an attempt to ram De Gaulle’s car but he was too late. De Gaulle’s driver, Francis Marroux, swerved through the gauntlet of fire and frantic vehicle activity in the kill zone and accelerated away. The following escort Citroen DS 19 did likewise as did the two motorcyclists.
It was reported that 8 rounds penetrated de Gaulle’s Citroen’s from both sides, two of which penetrated tyres and 187 shell casings were found at the scenes. The escort Citroen was also hit and one bullet was later found embedded in one of the police outrider’s helmet. Members of the ambush group declared that over 200 rounds were fired but some shell casings may have ejected inside their vehicles, fallen down drains, picked up in passing vehicle tyres or collected by souvenir hunters before the location was sealed off and forensically secured. The entire ambush attempt would have lasted mere seconds.
In comparison, 28 years previously the infamous American gangsters Bonnie Parker and Clyde Barrow had been roadside ambushed in their stolen car by six lawmen in Louisiana, USA. The lawmen had fired 130 rounds at their stationary car of which 112 rounds struck and penetrated the vehicle. This was from a mixture of semi and fully automatic weapons. Both Parker and Clyde died at the scene, Bonnie Parker had received twenty-six entrance wounds and Clyde Barrow suffered seventeen. Clyde Parker had escaped police vehicle ambushes before in instances where he had managed to keep moving. He had even practised and rehearsed such events and was acutely aware of the risk. Gendarme Marroux and the rest of President de Gaulle’s security team were also very aware The ranges in both ambushes were virtually the same and the weapons used were not dissimilar. The American lawmen were undoubtedly better skilled and prepared than the Petit Clarmart team.
President de Gaulle and his wife Yvonne despite all of this were extremely lucky. However there were factors that undoubtedly aided their fortune.
The Presidential convoy was travelling at a brisk speed and De Gaulle’s driver kept moving as he became immediately aware of the danger. Gendarme Marroux might well have actually seen Bastien-Thiry’s signal as he passed him which would have looked highly suspicious in the circumstances.
An ambush should only be initiated with one method – opening fire.
The north side gun team were late to initiate their fire plan as a result of not recognising Bastien-Thiry’s signal soon enough in the fading light. It would have been impossible for the south team to see Bastien-Thiry’s signal at all so they were entirely reliant on their north side colleagues initiating the ambush that they could then support.
Some of the ambush team’s weapons suffered from stoppages.
The route was clear enough ahead to maintain a fast escape pace because the ambush group had set up on a straight section of road with no natural or artificial obstacles to slow or impede the convoy.
The Citroen DS 19 cars had good handling characteristics with powered steering and pneumatic suspension. This enabled de Gaulle’s driver to maintain directional control even after two tyres on his vehicle were damaged.
Training and rehearsal for the ambush team was minimal along with the problems associated with weapon procurement. The team on many occasions had suffered from having to abandon attempts and as such were perhaps demoralised and tiring. All these factors contributed.
Despite all this it was a close call for President Charles de Gaulle and his security team. The ambush group had still managed to discharge a large concentration of fire at the passing convoy in a very short timeframe.
References to the ambush group being poor shots is too simplistic and frankly irrelevant. President Charles De Gaulle, his wife and the entire escort group were extremely lucky.
Most of the ambush group were eventually rounded up by the authorities. One of the group, Pierre Magade was a young Air Force deserter. Hitch hiking to Spain he was travelling with his own papers. Being immediately identified by the authorities as a deserter they apparently treated him with some destain; Magade was enraged and started to brag about his involvement in the Petit Clamart ambush. Eventually the whole team were apprehended and tried in a military court. They were all sentenced to prison terms except for six which included the three leaders and planners who were sentenced to death. The President commuted the sentences on five of these to life imprisonment but the leader of the group, Lt Col Jean Marie Bastien-Thiry, 35, was executed by firing squad at Fort Ivry in Paris on 11 March 1963. De Gaulle made an example of him. He was angered at the fact that he was in company with his wife and that only by pure luck was nobody killed let alone injured in the attack that used such an array of automatic weapons in a populated suburb amongst completely innocent people
Despite that, many people who neither condoned his action or were supporters of De Gaulle were surprised that Bastien-Thiry was executed. Many of the prison sentences were later considerably shortened.
President De Gaulle would ironically be present at the funeral of President John F Kennedy the following year in December 1963. JFK had been assassinated in Dallas, 22 November 1963. De Gaulle enjoyed good health but died suddenly at his home from an aneurysm in 1970 at the age of 78.
Alain de la Tocnaye was released after just five years in prison and published a book, ‘Comment je n’ai pas tue de Gaulle, (How I did not kill de Gaulle)’. He actively promoted it and remained outspoken about the event. His alleged response to people who questioned his murderous action against De Gaulle whilst also endangering his wife Yvonne who sat next to him was,
‘She married him for better or worse’.
In 1973 he met Ted Morgan, a journalist from the New York Times who wrote a fascinating article about Alain de Tocnaye, then 46 and who was apparently open and candid about this life. De Tocnaye included an amusing anecdote which he maintained had occurred earlier that year. De Tocnaye furtively visited the ambush site in Petit Clamart on what was no longer the Avenue de la Liberation but the renamed Avenue du General de Gaulle.
He entered the Café Au Trianon which had been in the line of fire during the ambush eleven years previously. The establishment had been renamed, Café Au Trianon de la Fusillade, (Café at Trianon from the Shooting). He ordered a glass of wine. He feigned ignorance and innocently asked the proprietor why the café had such a dramatic name; he was met with an incredulous response,
“ It’s when they shot at de Gaulle”, the proprietor retorted.
“You don’t say, when was that?”, pretended Tocnaye.
“Where have you been?, the proprietor replied in a surprised tone.
“In ’62, they shot up my whole terrace; I was reimbursed”.
Alain de la Tocnaye died at the age of 82 in 2009.